- Two US Navy SEALs drowned during a January attack on a ship delivering weapons to the Houthis.
- A new investigation reveals a series of mistakes that led to that fatal outcome.
- “This incident, marked by administrative problems, could have been avoided,” said a senior official.
Two US Navy SEALs drowned during an anti-missile raid off the coast of Somalia earlier this year. The investigation found that their deaths were preventable and ultimately due to a series of mistakes leading up to the dangerous mission.
Two SEALs were carrying heavy equipment during a nighttime raid on a small ship sailing in the Arabian Sea in January. When one fell into the water, he drowned. Another SEAL jumped into the water to save him, but was pulled under the water. The whole incident happened in less than a minute.
A lengthy, redacted investigation released Friday reveals many details of the deadly mission and what is believed to have led to the deaths of Chief Special Warfare Operator Christopher Chambers and Special Warfare Operator 1st Class Nathan Gage Ingram.
The investigation blamed the drowning on the “lack of safe and secure protection to provide protection” when it was necessary to “overcome the weight of the equipment, the fatigue caused by working physically hard and unable to tread water, or an accident occurred during the ride.”
“This event, marked by administrative issues, could have been prevented,” Deputy Adm. George M. Wikoff, commander of the US Naval Forces Central Command, said in the final version of the opinion repeated throughout the investigation.
A dangerous mission
On January 11, SEALs operating out of the USS Lewis B. Puller’s mobile base conducted a “sophisticated boarding” of a small vessel, known as a submarine, that was transporting weapons from Iran to of the Houthis in Yemen, the US Central Command said. at that time.
As helicopters and drones hovered above, three warships left the Puller and approached the ship in rough waters. Some commandos used a ladder that could be attached to board the ship, while others simply climbed the ship’s walls.
Chambers, who was carrying 48 kilograms of gear, tried to grab the boat but slipped and fell about 30 feet into the water. He tried to get back on board but was swept away by the wave .
Ingram, who was carrying an estimated 80 kilograms of equipment, jumped in seconds later to try to save Chambers, but he quickly sank into the sea, despite signs that he had tried to unload his gear and maneuver his flotation device. The water in the area is around 12,000 meters deep.
“When he saw his partner struggling, (Ingram) jumped into the water to help (Chambers),” the investigation said. “Since they are burdened by the weight of everyone’s equipment, neither their physical strength nor additional emergency equipment, if installed, was enough to keep them aloft.”
This whole incident happened in just 47 seconds. Efforts to find Chambers and Ingram began immediately, but after a 10-day search, the military declared them dead. Their names were investigated, but the Navy has since identified them as the two dead SEALs.
“We mourn the loss of two of our Naval Special Warfare veterans, and we will forever honor their sacrifice and example,” Centcom commander Gen. Michael Kurilla said in January.
The raid was completed and resulted in the US forces seizing a large number of weapons bound for the Houthis, including components for making missiles and missiles, which the Iran-backed rebels have used. attacking merchant shipping lanes in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.
A series of failures
According to the Naval Special Warfare Command’s training, tactics and procedures for boarding ships, one of the most dangerous aspects of a job like this is how to get into a suspect’s job, the investigation says.
“There is no doubt that the act of boarding a suspected smuggling vessel is dangerous and may increase the risk depending on the circumstances of the mission,” it says.
However, the investigation goes on to say that “weaknesses, gaps and inconsistencies in education, tactics, methods and procedures have created lost opportunities for protection that would have reduced the possibility of this event.”
According to the investigation, the gaps included conflicting guidance on buoyancy requirements, issues related to the maintenance of emergency response equipment, failure to recognize the dangers of aging, and failure to recognize the role emergency flotation devices and additional equipment that must be played to achieve success, the ability to float.
The investigation also called out inadequate training on the Tactical Flotation Support System device.
After a fatal incident, the investigation offers several recommended changes, including a review of training and increased pre-employment requirements such as equipment checks and aging.